Abstract. An important issue for economics and the decision sciences is to understand why allocation and decision procedures are plagued by manipulative and paradoxical behavior once there are n ≥ 3 alternatives. Valuable insight is obtained by exploiting the relative simplicity of the widely used Copeland method (CM). By use of a geometric approach, we characterize all CM manipulation, monotonicity, consistency, and involvement properties while identifying which profiles are susceptible to these difficulties. For instance, we show for n = 3 candidates that the CM reduces the negative aspects of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
question what should happen in a fixed population when the preferences change or new voters enter. The first normative concern leads to all of the monotonicitymanipulation issues; the second captures consistency conditions. While we focus on CM and related systems, we do so in a manner to develop two secondary themes. (Readers more interested in these secondary objectives can treat the CM as an illustrating example while reading up to Sect. 3.) To describe the first theme, notice that rather than being CM-specific, these multiple profile problems plague all decision and economic procedures. Surprisingly, a common explanation for all of these "oddities" holds for all preference aggregation procedures; it is easy to see what it is with the simple structure of CM.
The other secondary objective is to demonstrate the superiority of the geometric approach used here over the canonic combinatorial analysis of social choice. A source of this superiority is that combinatorics tend to be problem specific while geometry captures global relationships. Indeed, the particularized nature of combinatoric arguments usually requires us to use specialized methods to analyze each multiple profile theme. Consequently, results connecting different traits, such as the landmark conclusions of Maskin [Ma] and of Muller-Satterthwaite [MS] relating monotonicity with strategy-proofness, are well received. In general, however, this trait of combinatorics forces questions about monotonicity, manipulation, effects of truncated ballots and so forth to be treated as separate topics. This division is conceptually misleading and totally unnecessary; by using the power of geometry to "see" relationships, we show how all these topics become special cases of a single analysis. To emphasize the generality of this approach, both known and new results are proved with this method. This approach (from [S1, Chap. 4; S5, Chap. 5] ) is introduced with three-candidate elections so that the method can be illustrated with simple geometric figures from a common three-dimensional cube. After establishing the ideas, the n-candidate situation is described in a unified manner.
Another weakness of combinatorics is its analytic complexity; this is manifested by the growing realization that choice issues can be NP-hard [BO, BTT] . This complexity so seriously constrains the analysis that a typical conclusion merely specifies whether or not a procedure suffers a particular multiple profile problem. Such assertions are highly unsatisfying if only because common sense tells us that multiple profile difficulties are not universal problems. For instance, a voter failing to vote is not always rewarded with a better election outcome; a particular voter cannot always successfully manipulate the election. So, rather than being told that a procedure might suffer a problem, we prefer to know when and where.
Ideally, to learn whether a particular difficulty is serious or just a minor annoyance, we want to characterize which profiles can or cannot cause it. After all, only by specifying all profiles that are susceptible to various problems can we hope to recognize which difficulties can be dismissed as mere anomalies, to identify which situations should cause worry, to understand why these problems occur, and to transfer what we learn to other allocation and decision systems. But, the problem specific nature and the complexity of combinatorics frustrates attaining this goal. On the other hand, the geometric approach makes this identification problem surprisingly easy for the CM and the ideas extend to other procedures.
This leads to a third advantage of the geometric approach; by freeing us from the restrictive confines of combinatorics, the basic notions and conclusions transfer more easily to other systems. To see how this approach ( [S1, 5] ) aids the transfer of ideas, notice that once a particular two-profile issue is specified, we know the relationship between the profiles p 1 and p 2 . To illustrate with manipulative behavior, if c 1 is the p 1 -winner, then all voters with her top-ranked are content. Other voters, however, may want to vote strategically to try to elect a personally more preferred candidate. So, p 2 is found by assuming that the strategic voters vote in an optimal manner. Thus, by knowing p 1 , we also know who might vote strategically and how they should do it. Similarly, to determine what happens when a voter forgets to vote, p 2 is defined from p 1 by omitting this voter. Indeed, for any multiple profile concern involving changes in an original profile p 1 , the change defines p 2 .
The next step is to discover whether the profile change affects the outcome. It does iff p 1 and p 2 are in different profile sets where each set supports different conclusions. Consequently, a new outcome arises only if the profile change crosses the boundary separating these sets. So, by finding the geometric boundaries of these profile sets (which is surprisingly easy to do for many procedures), not only can we characterize which profile changes can cross the boundary (i.e., which multiple profile concerns can occur), but we can identify where this can happen (i.e., we can identify all p 1 choices).
Intuitively, this approach resembles shooting a water pistol. The nozzle corresponds to p 1 while the weakly expelled water represents p 2 . Whether a target (i.e., the separating boundary between profile sets) is hit depends on the position of the pistol (p 1 ) and how it is aimed (p 2 − p 1 ). The target's orientation (at each point) is represented by a vector perpendicular to the surface pointing in the desired direction of water flow. If the angle between the aimed pistol and the vector is less than 90 o , then the water is shot where we want; if this angle exceeds 90 o , we are aiming in the wrong direction. More ambitiously, if the pistol is held in a fixed direction (so the direction p 2 − p 1 is fixed), by examining the normal vectors at each point, we can establish which portions of the surface (i.e., which profiles p 1 ) satisfy the directional requirements. This description is independent of dimension and choice of direction (p 2 − p 1 ), so by describing the geometric boundaries of the relevant profile sets, this "water pistol" approach characterizes how to analyze all multiple profile issues for any procedure.
Three-candidate CM results
To introduce the geometry supporting the basic approach, start with the n = 3 candidates {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 }. The six ways to linearly rank (without indifference) them define the six voter types (2.1) 1 c 1 c 2 c 3 3 c 3 c 1 c 2 5 c 2 c 3 c 1 2 c 1 c 3 c 2 4 c 3 c 2 c 1 6 c 2 c 1 c 3
Instead of listing how many voters are of each type, it suffices to list the fraction of voters with a particular ranking. Thus, if p j is the fraction of all voters with a type-j preference, j = 1, . . . , 6, then, because the sum of the fractions equals unity, a profile can be identified with a point in the simplex (2.2) Si(6) = { (x 1 , . . . , x 6 ) | 6 j=1
x j = 1, x j ≥ 0}.
Each rational point in Si(6) defines a class of integer profiles because the total number of voters can be any common denominator for the six fractions.
According to Table 2 .1, the {c 1 , c 2 } pairwise election is determined by (2.3)
where a positive value requires over half of the voters to prefer c 1 , a negative value means that c 2 wins this pairwise competition, and a zero value corresponds to a tie. Thus, the hyperplane H 3 1,2 defined by p 1 + p 2 + p 3 − p 4 − p 5 − p 6 = 0 divides the profile space into three regions; H 3 1,2 is the profile set where the candidates are pairwise tied, and each side of H 3 1,2 defines the profile set supporting a different candidate. (The superscript "3" denotes the number of candidates.) By using standard properties of gradient vectors with respect to level sets, it follows from the x 1,2 = 0 equation that
is orthogonal to H 3 1,2 and it points into the profile set supporting c 1 . Thus a profile change in this general direction helps c 1 and hurts c 2 . Similarly, by using Table 2 .1 to determine who would vote for whom, the equations
represent the remaining pairwise elections where x j,k > 0 means that c j beats c k , the level set x j,k = 0 is the hyperplane H 3 j,k dividing the profiles into the three profile sets for the different outcomes, and N 3 j,k is the normal vector for H 3 j,k pointing into the profile set ensuring the c j pairwise victory. Notice that x j,k = −x k,j and N 3 j,k = −N 3 k,j . Three candidates define three pairs, so all pairwise outcomes can be depicted as points in a three-dimensional figure called the representation cube where the usual (x, y, z) coordinates are replaced with (x 1,2 , x 2,3 , x 3,1 ). As −1 ≤ x j,k ≤ 1, start with the three-dimensional cube defined by these values. The actual pairwise election outcomes are the cube points further restricted by −1 ≤ x 1,2 + x 2,3 + x 3,1 ≤ 1. These inequalities, which determine the slanted sides of the representation cube in Fig.1 From the neutrality of CM, we can assume without loss of generality that c 1 is the CM winner. In Fig. 1, c 1 is the Condorcet winner in the region where x 1,2 > 0, x 3,1 < 0 (in standard coordinates, the x > 0, z < 0 region). Cyclic rankings are the positive and negative orthants where {x 1,2 > 0, x 2,3 > 0, x 3,1 > 0} and {x 1,2 < 0, x 2,3 < 0, x 3,1 < 0}. The CM c 1 c 2 c 3 ranking region is the orthant x > 0, y > 0, z < 0 (i.e., x 1,2 , x 2,3 > 0, x 1,3 < 0) along with portions of coordinate planes (e.g., (x = 0, y ≤ 0, z < 0) and (x > 0, y = 0, z ≤ 0)). For our purposes, c 1 is a CM top-ranked candidate iff the outcome is in D 3 (c 1 ); this is the union of the two cyclic regions, the c 1 -Condorcet region, specific portions of the two bounding planes for the c 1 -Condorcet region {x 1,2 = 0, x 3,1 < 0}, {x 1,2 > 0, x 3,1 = 0}, and the origin x 1,2 = x 2,3 = x 3,1 = 0. The D 3 (c j ) sets supporting the selection of other alternatives are symmetric. Notice that outside of the c 1 -Condorcet region, the D 3 (c 1 ) outcomes require c 1 to share the honor of being CM top-ranked (e.g., in the two cyclic regions all candidates are CM winners while in (x = 0, z < 0, y > 0), {c 1 , c 2 } are the winners). 2.1. Illustrating examples. All three-candidate concerns can be analyzed by applying almost identical arguments to the geometry of D 3 (c 1 ). So, this setting is used to introduce the basic technique. Unless otherwise stated, assume p 1 has no pairwise tie votes.
Monotonicity.
A procedure is monotonic should a candidate still be elected after some voters rank her higher while each voter's relative ranking of all other candidates remains unchanged. Suppose, for example, that after watching a TV debate, Mr. Smith decides to rank Ms. Young second instead of last while keeping fixed his relative ranking of the other two candidates. We would expect this preference change to help, not hurt, Young's chances. Indeed, procedures failing monotonicity (such as, say, runoff elections [Sm, S1] ) admit the perversity that a candidate can be beaten by increasing her support! Suppose c 1 , Young, is a CM winner. Before the debate, Smith had c 1 bottomranked, so in the original profile p 1 his type was either four or five; assume he was type-four with the c 3 c 2 c 1 ranking. By changing his preferences as described, he changes from type-four to -three, so after the debate there is one less type-four voter and one more type-three out of the M voters. Letting E j denote a profile of type-j, the profile change is
To verify monotonicity, we must determine whether any p 1 supporting a D 3 (c 1 ) outcome allows the d 4→3 profile change (Smith's change of preferences) to dislodge c 1 (Young) from victory. With the geometric water pistol approach, the equivalent question is to determine whether there is a normal vector N i,j pointing in the direction of helping c 1 (i.e., pointing toward the interior of D 3 (c 1 )) where its angle with d 4→3 exceeds 90
o . This angular information is found from the sign of the scalar product of two non-zero vectors
where positive, negative, and zero values require, respectively, the angle to be less than, greater than, and equal to 90 o . (As the boundaries are hyperplanes, a zero value requires the profile change to be parallel to the boundary; it cannot cross.) A computation shows that (N 1,2 
Thus, the d 4→3 profile change fails to influence the {c 1 , c 3 } and the {c 2 , c 3 } pairwise outcomes, but it has a positive impact (for c 1 ) on the {c 1 , c 2 } election. The same elementary computations prove this is true for any such profile change. Consequently, we recover the established (e.g., see [N] ) fact.
Theorem 1. For n = 3 candidates, CM is monotonic.
Proof. Because of neutrality, what happens relative to c 2 also happens relative to c 3 . Therefore, restrict attention to voters of initial type k = 3, 4. All admissible profile changes are d k→j with the (k, j) pairs (3, 2), (4, 3), (4, 2). A direct computation shows that < N 2,3 , d k→j >= 0 and all remaining < N 1,i , d k→j >≥ 0. Such changes can help, but not hurt, c 1 .
Abstention. For a second scenario, suppose Smith not only missed the TV debate (so Young, c 1 , remains his bottom-ranked candidate), but he forgot to vote. Surely, this helps her; or does it? As a type-four voter, Smith's actions change the original M -voter profile p 1 by dropping one type-four voter to define the profile change
i,j , p 1 ) value returns the {c i , c j } pairwise election outcome (which is nearly equal to zero iff this pairwise election is nearly a tie). Therefore, the relevant portion of this profile change -the part that indicates whether a new outcome occurs -is the E 4 = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) term. Computations prove that (N A potential abstention paradox, however, arises with the (N 3 3,2 , −E 4 ) = −1 computation. As N 3 3,2 is an inward normal vector only along the x 2,3 = 0 boundary on the negative orthant, for such a paradox to occur, the p 1 outcome must be in the negative orthant (where the cyclic outcome requires all candidates to be CM winners) and the new outcome moves in a direction favoring c 2 in the {c 2 , c 3 } election.
(The 1 M −1 scalar term requires p 1 to be close -a voter away -from the boundary.) According to Fig. 2 , Smith's forgetful actions can change the {c 2 , c 3 } outcome to either c 2 ∼ c 3 or c 2 c 3 . We end up, then, with an "ambiguous" situation where by voting all candidates, including Smith's bottom-ranked candidate Young, are CM winners, or by not voting, c 2 , his middle-ranked candidate becomes the sole winner. Whether the outcome is more favorable depends on how Smith ranks these two possibilities. Indeed, the n = 3 CM-behavior is characterized by these "ambiguous" options where whether the voter finds the outcome to be better depends on whether he prefers to have his second-ranked candidate, or all three candidates declared the CM winner. Whatever the choice, there are voter types and profiles (i.e., there are enough D 3 (c 1 ) surfaces) where, by not voting, the ambiguous abstention paradox occurs. Proof. Again this proof just reduces to checking the various scalar products.
From the above, if a type-k voter forgets to vote, the effective portion of the profile change is −E k . Again, thanks to neutrality, we can assume that k = 3, 4. This −E k change can hurt c 1 (so an abstention paradox occurs) only if < N 3 , −E k >= −n k < 0 where N 3 = (n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n 6 ) is one of the four normal vectors on boundaries of D 3 (c 1 ). From Eqs. 2.4, 2.5, this holds only for (k = 3, N = N 3 3,2 , N 3 1,2 ), and (k = 4, N = N 3 3,2 ). Only k = 3 remains to be analyzed. When N = N 3 3,2 is an inward normal, for the abstention paradox to occur, the p 1 outcome must be in the negative orthant near the x 2,3 = 0 boundary surface. From Fig. 2 , the profile change crowns c 2 , the voter's bottom-ranked candidate, as the winner. This is not an improvement for this voter.
When N 3 1,2 is the inner vector, the p 1 outcome must be in one of the orthants of the c 1 -Condorcet region. Thus, the CM winner is the voter's second-ranked candidate. According to Fig. 2 , when this profile change forces a new outcome, either the outcome is in the region where c 2 , the voter's bottom-ranked candidate, is the CM winner, or it is in the negative orthant where all candidates share the title. Only the last situation is potentially favorable for this voter; it defines the second possibility for the ambiguous situation. The theorem now follows.
Strategic voting.
As a third scenario, suppose after missing the TV debate, Smith learns that Young is a projected CM winner. Adopting an "anyone but Young (c 1 )" attitude, Smith wishes to vote strategically to defeat her. His available options are 3,2 requires the p 1 outcome to be in the negative orthant, so the CM defines a three-way tie caused by the cycle c 2 c 1 , c 3 c 2 , c 1 c 3 . Again, the p 1 outcome must be sufficiently close to a boundary to allow Smith's changed vote to cause a c 3 ∼ c 2 tie or c 2 c 3 victory (and the CM ranking c 2 c 1 c 3 ).
These possibilities offer Smith the three j = 1, 5, 6 options. (The effect of all of these options is that Smith now votes for his middle-ranked candidate, rather than his top-ranked c 3 , in the {c 2 , c 3 } election.) For instance, by pretending to be a type-one voter, he could slyly manipulate ([S1]) the outcome; e.g., he could publicly announce and vote for Young (using the ranking c 1 c 2 c 3 ) safe in the knowledge that this will defeat her! (This example demonstrates why the definition of "monotonicity" requires the voters to improve the status of a particular candidate while keeping the relative rankings of all others fixed. To see this, notice that while d 4→1 improves c 1 's status, it also changes the relative rankings of other candidates. It is this new direction of profile change (relative to the normal vectors of the boundaries) that allows c 1 to be hurt by a new profile that should enhance her standing.)
Observe the heavy price Smith pays for his obsession to defeat Young; his strategic vote causes his top-ranked candidate c 3 to lose her status as a CM winner. An interesting issue, then, is to determine whether other voters could enjoy more strategic success, or whether this example identifies a CM trait; a trait that significantly mitigates the effects of strategic voting. To address this question where c 1 is a CM winner, the potential strategic voters (identified by subscript k) and their strategic actions are d k→j = 1 M (E j − E k ), k = 3, 4, 5, 6, j = 1, . . . , 6. The symmetry of neutrality allows us to restrict attention to k = 3, 4.
Again, the analysis only involves determining where < N 3 , d k→j >= n j −n k < 0. That is, we only need to examine the N 3 vectors of Eqs. 2.4, 2.5 to determine which ones have a positive kth component and a negative jth component. For N 3 1,2 , the (k, j) choices are (3, j), j = 4, 5, 6,; for N 3 3,2 they are (3, j) and (4, j); j = 1, 5, 6. Again, as the indicated inner normals determine which boundary surfaces of D 3 (c 1 ) are involved, all that remains is to use Fig. 2 to compare the old and new outcomes to determine whether they correspond to a personal improvement.
We have examined k = 4, so now consider k = 3 and N 3 3,2 . Again, the choice of N 3 3,2 requires the p 1 outcome to define a cycle. Here the strategic action requires the voter to vote for his bottom ranked candidate against c 1 ! Again, the p 1 outcome has all candidates as CM winners and the strategic action forces c 2 to be the sole CM winner. The proof of this theorem follows from the above computations. The remaining strategic situations are the unlikely settings with two or more pairwise ties. Here there are more directions for a successful strategic move (because there are two or more relevant normal vectors); the proofs are the same. Indeed, with two ties, certain voters can include their second-ranked candidate with the CM sincere winner c 1 , and with all pairwise votes ending in ties, a voter can get his second-ranked candidate selected. As these regions correspond to edges of D 3 (c 1 ) in Fig.2 with simple dot product computations, we leave the simple analysis to the reader.
Effects of mistakes.
Carrying this analysis a step further, recognize that the only way a type-three voter can have success is if the p 1 outcome is near the cyclic region. But, suppose this voter makes an ever so slight miscalculation because, in fact, the p 1 outcome already is in a cyclic region near either a c 1 c 3 boundary (of the negative orthant because x 3,1 < 0) or a c 2 c 3 boundary (of the positive orthant because x 2,3 > 0). This error converts a previously clever d 3→6 strategy, which affects the outcome for all three pairs, into a disastrous move! This is because now either c 1 or c 2 becomes the sole CM winner. Not only is neither candidate topranked for our strategic voter, but his top-ranked c 3 is dropped. In fact, it follows immediately from Fig. 2 that there are more opportunities (i.e., more choices of p 1 ) where a particular strategy is counter-productive than strategically helpful.
(As another way to prove this, note that the < N 3 , d k→j > term is positive for several N 3 choices. This identifies the p 1 locations where each strategy back fires.) This assertion must be expected in general; because a strategic voter needs to vote in a manner that appears to be counter-productive, often it is.
These illustrations provide new insight into CM strategic behavior; insight that removes much of the sting of the Gibbard [G] -Satterthwaite [St] Theorem. They underscore, for instance, the critical fact that to avoid being counter-productive a strategic action must be accompanied by surprisingly precise information about the other voters' preferences and intended action. Without knowing the precise p 1 value, a strategic action can hurt, rather than assist, a voter's interests. But, with the exception of Congress and other settings where votes are announced in advance, it is not clear whether such precise information is commonly available. Consequently, it is not clear whether CM strategic action is, in general, wise. Furthermore, the examples prove that for a strategic action to be successful, the original outcome must satisfy exacting and highly unlikely conditions. So, except in contrived examples of the types used to illustrate academic articles, one must wonder whether strategic voting is a practical CM concern. Indeed, at least for n = 3 candidates, just by carrying out the indicated simple computations, we learn that a penalty usually accompanies CM strategic attempts. (Similarly, by forgetting to vote, a voter usually hurts his cause.) Weak consistency. Suppose there are only two election districts where, on election night, Young's poll watcher from each district informs her that she is a CM winner in that district. Should her victory party start? Both profiles, p 1 , p 2 , define results in D 3 (c 1 ) and the full profile is p 3 = λp 1 + (1 − λ)p 2 where λ is the fraction of all voters that reside in the first district. The p 3 -CM outcome, then, is on the line connecting the CM outcomes for p 1 and p 2 ; the group outcome is determined by the λ value. (It is λ of the distance from the first outcome to the second.) To determine what can happen by combining the votes, it suffices to examine whether lines can be drawn in Fig. 2 with both endpoints in D 3 (c 1 ) while portions of the line are outside of this region.
If both endpoints are in a c 1 -Condorcet winner region, then the convexity of this region requires the full line to remain in this region (so Young remains a CM winner). However, with endpoints in different cyclic regions (the positive and negative orthants), it is easy to position the line so that portions are in any desired region. Consequently, the combined outcome can be whatever is desired; Young could be the sole CM winner, she could share this status with either one or both other candidates, or she could be CM jth ranked candidate for j = 2 or 3. With more districts, the outcome is p = k j=1 λ j p j , where k j=1 λ j = 1, λ j ≥ 0, so the same conclusion holds; e.g., even if Young is a CM winner in all regions, she could be the overall CM loser. We leave it to the reader to experiment with Fig. 2 to show that even if p 1 is in the c 1 -Condorcet region, c 1 can lose should p 2 be in a cyclic region (because the union of these regions loses convexity).
To summarize, a choice procedure is weakly consistent [S1, 3] Proof. The conclusion follows immediately from the nonconvexity of D 3 (c 1 ).
Unified approach.
These scenarios sample significantly different themes, but conceptually and technically the analysis remains the same. What emerges is the lesson (which holds for all decision and allocation procedures) that whether a profile change can cause expected, unexpected, or paradoxical outcomes depends upon the location of the original profile and the geometry of the boundary set. The CM is an important example because its simpler geometry divides these effects into geometrically separate regions. More specifically, the Condorcet region ({x 1,2 > 0,
is where the consequences of profile changes are of the expected type. This benign behavior is preserved by the normal vectors N In this same geometric manner all other multiple profile CM issues -whether they involve groups or individuals -can be examined. Specifying a topic determines the profile change vectors, d, while the signs of scalar products (using Eq. 2.7 and the N 3 j,k normal vectors) determine what can occur, where, and how to do it. The choice of N 3 j,k at various profiles and the use of Fig. 2 determine whether the change helps or hurts a particular candidate and/or a group of voters. For instance, it now is easy to analyze the strategic action of a group of voters of different types. (The resulting conclusion also identifies the highly exacting and carefully coordinated conditions that must exist.)
The same geometric approach holds for all other allocation and decision procedures ( [S1, S5] ). To illustrate, consider "positional voting" procedures which are defined by the weights (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ), w 1 = 1, 0 ≤ w 2 ≤ 1, w 3 = 0, where w j points are assigned to a voter's jth ranked candidate. The election tallies for c 1 , c 2 , c 3 are, respectively, p 1 + p 2 + w 2 p 3 + w 2 p 6 , w 2 p 1 + w 2 p 4 + p 5 + p 6 , w 2 p 2 + p 3 + p 4 + w 2 p 5 . Thus, a c 1 ∼ c 2 vote occurs when the first summation minus the second is zero. Using the gradient of this level set equation, the normal vector favoring c 1 over c 2 is N = (1 − w 2 , 1, w 2 , −w 2 , −1, w 2 − 1). For instance, the effect of Smith not voting, d = −E 4 , helps c 1 as (N, −E 4 ) = w 2 ≥ 0, and, because < N, d 4→j >= n j + w 2 , if a p 1 outcome is near this surface, then all of Smith's d 4→j strategic choices to elect c 2 over c 1 are j = 5, 6 for w 2 < 1 2 and j = 5 for
In other words, to analyze other procedures, we just need to determine the new boundary normals.
More candidates; more possibilities
These n = 3 CM-conclusions extend to any number of candidates. The main difference is that the geometric figures need to be replaced with an analytic description of the regions where c 1 is CM top-ranked. This D n (c 1 ) set is the union of the region of pairwise votes where c 1 is a Condorcet winner, of portions of the bounding hyperplanes (plus portions of certain lower dimensional parts of the boundary) of this Condorcet region, along with many regions with cyclic rankings. By being the union of so many regions (where several have cycles), D n (c 1 ) has added boundaries with different orientations. But each new boundary orientation provides new opportunities for profile changes to leave or enter D n (c 1 ), so we must expect more kinds of multiple profile concerns.
These new boundary orientations come from the cyclic regions of D n (c 1 ), so it follows that unexpected or strategic outcomes tend to be caused by cyclic rankings. That is, when the voters have mixed views about the selection of the available substitutes (as manifested by the cycle), the change in the ranking of some seemingly unrelated pair of candidates can adversely affect c 1 's fate. Namely, precisely when we need the CM because a Condorcet winner does not exist, troubles arise! Nevertheless, the CM geometry conveniently separates the effects of those outcomes that are to be expected from paradoxical or manipulative conclusions.
Technical description.
The n ≥ 3 candidates define n! voter types; list them in some order. If p j represents the fraction of voters with the jth ranking, then a profile can be represented by a point in the simplex
The profile set supporting a pairwise tie vote between c i and c j defines the hyperplane H n i,j ; the n 2 = n(n−1) 2 pairs define n 2 such hyperplanes. Each side of H n i,j is a profile set supporting the pairwise victory of one of {c i , c j }. The normal vector N n i,j points into the side of H n i,j where c i beats c j and has entries equally divided between 1 and −1; the positive values correspond to that half of the coordinates (voter types) representing the relative ranking c i c j . As the CM depends upon the number of pairwise victories, ties, and defeats of each candidate, the boundaries of the profile sets supporting each CM outcome consist of portions of these H n i,j hyperplanes. Therefore, the potential CM effects of a given profile change d is determined by the sign of the scalar product (N n i,j , d). As true in Sect. 2, to avoid the higher dimensional geometry of R n! we emphasize the geometry of the space of pairwise votes. Following [S1, S5] , the election tallies for the n 2 pairs defines a point in R ( n 2 ) where
n is the cube in R ( n 2 ) where −1 ≤ x i,j ≤ 1, each unanimity profile defines a vertex of C n ; this identifies n! of the 2 ( n 2 ) vertices. The representation cube (the space of pairwise election outcomes resulting from voters with transitive preferences) is the convex hull of these vertices. Any (rational) point in the representation cube is supported by a profile. Geometrically, D n (c 1 ) is the union of the c 1 -Condorcet region (i.e., where x 1,j > 0 for all j), portions of certain boundaries of this region (as some x 1,j values are zero, the admissible boundaries are where the number of positive coordinates x 1,i is at least as large as the difference between positive and negative values of coordinates x k,m for any k), plus regions with cyclic rankings (where the pairwise victories from the cycle cancel one another to contribute CM scores of zero) where c 1 's CM score is the largest.
To illustrate with n = 4, the cyclic scores where x 1,2 , x 2,3 , x 3,4 , x 4,1 are all positive contribute a CM tally of zero for each candidate. Thus, the signs of the remaining two pairwise outcomes, Proof. The assertion about N n 1,j always being an interior normal follows from the form of the CM; more votes for c 1 provide a higher c 1 score. For n = 3, the Proposition follows from the geometry of the two cyclic regions of Fig. 2 . For n = 4, modify the above example involving a three-candidate cycle by replacing c 2 , c 3 with c i , c j , and then create a second example (a second region of D 4 (c 1 )) by reversing each ranking in the original cycle. A similar modification of the first n = 4 example shows how two candidates can be CM top-ranked. The proof for n ≥ 5 is similar but technically more complicated, so it is in the Appendix.
The importance of Prop. 1 is that it explains the geometry of the region where c 1 is CM top-ranked; that is, for n ≥ 4 alternatives, Prop. 1 replaces Figs. 1 and 2 for n = 3 alternatives. In Sect. 2, these figures were used, along with the N 3 normal vectors, to determine which profile changes help or hurt each candidate. The next proposition does the same in analytic terms for n ≥ 4. 3.2. Changes that make a difference. Armed with Props. 1 and 2, we now can quickly resolve multiprofile issues just by defining the profile change associated with an issue. To illustrate, we start with the strong restriction on profile changes imposed by monotonicity. More precisely, monotonicity requires that if c 1 is selected with the original profile, then a voter changing his ranking of c 1 must rank her higher than previously while keeping the relative ranking of the remaining n − 1 candidates unchanged. This definition requires all admissible changes to be in a N 1,j direction. Although some pairwise methods, such as runoff elections and agendas, fail to be monotonic (this means that the boundary regions of their D(c 1 ) region admit interior vectors of the −N n 1,j type), the following known statement (e.g., see [N] ) indicates that the CM geometry is better behaved.
Theorem 5. For n ≥ 3 candidates, the CM is monotonic.
Proof. Admissible changes are only in N n 1,j directions. According to Prop. 1, this change can help, not hurt c 1 . The conclusion follows.
To appreciate the monotonicity conditions, relax them until conditions emerge where c 1 can be hurt by receiving increased support. One change is to permit voters to improve c 1 's ranking even if she is not top-ranked. Although this new definition requires sets other than D n (c 1 ) to be analyzed, admissible changes remain in the direction N n 1,j , so this increased support can help, but never hurt, c 1 's CM standing. A more interesting way to relax monotonicity is to admit changes in directions other than N n 1,j . For instance, after hearing a debate between c 1 and c 2 , a voter may rerank the candidates to c 1 's advantage just by interchanging c 1 and c 2 . If c 2 was ranked more than one above c 1 where, say, c 3 separated them, then this c 1 -improvement also creates a profile change in the N To see the importance of this new conclusion, notice that when a new issue is raised, the analysis only involves computing the appropriate profile change. According to Prop. 2 and Thm. 6, there are situations where any non-monotonic change can add or subtract specified candidates from the CM top-ranked class. Consequently there exist situations where any {c i , c j } change can help or hurt c 1 's status. As illustrated next, this is true whether the profile changes occur when:
1. The number of voters remains the same. This includes issues such as monotonicity, manipulation, and Pareto conditions. (For the CM, this statement extends aspects of Maskin's assertion [Ma] (relating a different form of monotonicity and strategy-proofness) to include all issues where a profile change need not be monotonic.) 2. The number of voters change. This includes the effects of abstention, consistency, etc. 3. Preferences are not strict. This addresses issues such as truncated ballots where a voter refuses to vote for certain candidates because he knows nothing about them. In each setting, Prop. 2 identifies both the profile sets allowing a specified multiple profile change and the kinds of results which follow.
3.3. Same number of voters. As Thm. 6 addresses the monotonicity concerns, the remaining issues include game theoretic changes and strategic voting. We start with a known result ( [N, p. 84 This assertion does not hold for all voting procedures -even those using pairwise outcomes. To see this, consider the agenda that matches the (c 3 , c 2 ) majority winner against c 1 , and that majority winner against c 4 . Although c 4 wins with the three voter profile c 1 c 2 c 3 c 4 , c 2 c 3 c 4 c 1 , c 3 c 4 c 1 c 2 , this is not a Pareto outcome because all voters strictly prefer c 3 to c 4 .
Proof. We need to show that no candidate is universally preferred to c 1 , a CM top-ranked candidate. Assume this is false because all voters prefer c 2 c 1 . Then c 1 loses the {c 1 , c 2 } pairwise contest. Moreover, for every {c 1 , c j } election that c 1 wins, c 2 wins the {c 2 , c j } election. Thus, c 2 is CM ranked higher than c 1 .
For manipulative outcomes, it is to the advantage of a voter of type k to vote as type j if d k→j now elects a candidate this voter prefers to c 1 . According to Prop. 2, this always is possible, so it remains to characterize the p 1 choices allowing this manipulation and to determine whether a n ≥ 4 candidate CM election can be manipulated without incurring the ambiguity described in Thm. 3. Proof. For any of this to occur, p 1 ∈ D n (c 1 ) must be near a D n (c 1 ) boundary. If p 1 is near H n 2,j , then, to assist c 2 , the move must be in the N n 2,j direction. So, for a change to be possible, the strategic voter must have c j c 2 but votes for c 2 in the {c 2 , c j } election. If p 1 is near a H n 1,j boundary, then as the only normal is N n 1,j , the change must be in the −N n 1,j direction. For this change, the sincere ranking must be c 1 c j and the strategic voter votes for c j over c 1 . According to Prop. 2, there always exist such situations where c 1 and c 2 are the only two-top-ranked candidates, and a change in the N n 2,j direction leaves D n (c 1 ). Without ties, this is possible only with n ≥ 4. The theorem now follows.
This theorem proves that although the CM resists the consequences of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem with three candidates, the sting of this assertion returns once n ≥ 4. Moreover, with Prop. 2, it is easy to concoct other manipulative settings. (Any change in the rankings of any other two candidates can affect c 1 's CM status -in some cases favorably, in others, negatively.) 3.4. Changing numbers of voters. Consistency first was explored by Smith [Sm] and Young [Y] . Later, Saari [S1, 3, 5] relaxed the conditions to allow them to apply to a wider variety of procedures. The relaxed condition of "weak consistency" is to determine if the CM top-ranked candidates for p 1 and p 2 agree, must this be so when the profiles are combined? Again, the answer is no. Proof. The convexity of the c 1 Condorcet region means that if p 1 , p 2 are in this region then so is λp 1 + (1 − λ)p 2 . Thus, counter examples for weak consistency require regions with cyclic rankings. The rest of the theorem requires showing that D n (c 1 ) is not convex. This is done with Prop. 1. For instance, place p 1 in a region with one cycle and p 2 in the region defined by the reversed cycle but where all other pairwise rankings are the same for both regions. (Because the representation cube meets all 2 n orthants, this always is possible to do.) In fact, according to the proposition and its proof, the non-cyclic rankings can be chosen so that c 1 is only one of the CM top-ranked candidates and c 1 is involved in both cycles. Now, the straight line connecting p 1 and p 2 must pass through each of the H n i,j surfaces for each {c i , c j } pair involved in a cycle. Just by moving either endpoint ensures that the line does not pass through more than one surface at a time. (The orthant is open, the regions where several surfaces meet is lower dimensional.) In fact, by choosing the points appropriately, it is possible to choose which surface the line passes through first. Thus, there are points on this line where the previous c 1 c j ranking from one cycle is reversed, dropping c 1 from the top-rank.
Now consider what might happen should a voter vote, or not vote. Such an analysis includes the abstention paradox that Fishburn and Gerhlein [FG] , Moulin [M] , and Saari [S1,2,5] have analyzed for other procedures. Using the terminology of [S1,5] , we consider the following natural requirements: Positive involvement -If c 1 is CM top-ranked, adding a voter who has her top-ranked should not weaken her CM status. Negative involvement -The status of c 1 should not improve when a new voter is added who has her bottom-ranked.
Theorem 10. For n ≥ 3, the CM satisfies neither positive nor negative involvement.
This theorem shows that Moulin's conclusion [M] requiring all Condorcet methods to suffer the abstention paradox also holds for the CM. Again, thanks to the propositions, the proof is trivial.
Proof. For positive involvement, let p 1 ∈ D n (c 1 ) be near a H n i,j boundary with, say, N n i,j as the interior normal. According to Prop. 2, there are positions for p 1 so that a {c i , c j } change will cause the outcome to leave D n (c 1 ). In particular, adding a voter with c 1 top-ranked and with the appropriate {c i , c j } change will hurt c 1 . Notice that this proof extends to many other procedures.
3.5. Loss of strict rankings. Now consider those situations where voters don't have a transitive ranking of the candidates, or don't rank all of them. If the group's ranking of pairs involves a cycle, the CM scoring approach cancels the cycle and ranks the candidates based on the remaining rankings of pairs. This need not be true if an individual has cyclic rankings; instead, a vote on a particular pair could alter its ranking. From this, the identity of the CM top-ranked candidates could change. A similar situation occurs should a voter have a transitive ranking for only a subset of the candidates. Some of these notions are discussed in the work of Fishburn and Brams [FB1, FB2] Proof. In each of these cases, the profile change d can be defined so that < N In summary, the geometry of D n (c 1 ), n ≥ 4, is sufficiently rich to admit a host of CM problems and paradoxes. Indeed, as long as the change is not a special case of monotonicity, examples can be found where it helps, or where it hurts any specified candidate. The important fact is that all of these different behaviors and oddities can be easily analyzed in the same way. Moreover, this same approach extends to other decision and voting procedures. As the jth candidate's CM score is the sum of terms in the jth row, the conclusion holds.
For n even, a m CM top-ranked candidate example, n 2 + 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1, is constructed by reversing the values for the last m nonzero entries in the last column. (This also reverses the last m non-zero entries of the bottom row.) As these are the only candidates who lose another pairwise election (to c n ) and as c n still has more losses than victories, the conclusion follows. For 1 ≤ m ≤ n 2 − 1 CM top-ranked candidates, the analysis is slightly modified. For c 1 to be the only top-ranked candidate, change the first −1 in the first row to +1 (which means that the first +1 in the first column now becomes a −1 and that c 1 now beats c n 2 +1 ). Notice that c 1 has one more victory than c 2 , . . . , c n
2
. To have m top-ranked candidates, do the same for the first m rows (with corresponding changes for the first m columns). This argument has to be modified for m = 1 2 . Here, for the first m rows, let the first m entries after the diagonal be +1 and the rest −1. This gives each of these candidates a CM score of 1, where, with this assignment, c n−j has n 2 − j − 1 victories. To ensure that all of these candidates end up with a negative score, fill in the rest of the rows to th right of the diagonal with −1.
For odd values of n, all candidates can be tied for top-rank. To prove this, let each row have +1 for the first n−1 2 entries after the diagonal and −1 for the rest. But, without ties, it is impossible to have n − 1 CM top-ranked candidates when n is odd. This is because the smallest non-negative CM scores are 2 and 0. As the sum of CM scores equals zero, one candidate must have a negative score so all others must have at least 2 points. As this means there are at least 2(n−1) positive points and at most −(n − 1) for negative scores, this violates the CM summation constraint.
To show that any other k value is admissible, start where all entries in the last column are +1 (so all candidates beat c n ). Because an even number of candidates remain, the above analysis can be applied to this submatrix. It remains to show that H n i,j , i, j = 1, is a boundary for one of these regions when k ≥ 2. In the construction, both c 1 and c 2 are top-ranked, and there are candidates other than c 1 who beat c 2 . Suppose this is c s . So, if the {c 2 , c s } election would be reversed, c 2 would have one more victory than c 1 and this would drop c 1 as a top-ranked candidate. Thus, portions of H n 2,s serve as part of the boundary of D n (c 1 ) with interior normal N n 2,s . For i, j where we want N n i,j to be an interior normal, interchange the second and ith rows and columns, and the sth and jth rows and columns.
The same construction shows that D n (c 1 ) can be divided into sections indicating the number of candidates that are CM top-ranked. Similarly, it shows that each H n i,j is part of the separating boundary between these regions and that, in different sections, both ±N n i,j are interior normal vectors.
